New Directions
Volume 14 | Issue 3

Article 7

7-1-1987

Race and the Global Political Economy
Winston E. Langley

Follow this and additional works at: http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections
Recommended Citation
Langley, Winston E. (1987) "Race and the Global Political Economy," New Directions: Vol. 14: Iss. 3, Article 7.
Available at: http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol14/iss3/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Howard @ Howard University. It has been accepted for inclusion in New Directions by
an authorized administrator of Digital Howard @ Howard University. For more information, please contact lopez.matthews@howard.edu.

Langley: Race and the Global Political Economy

a nation in decline, that is "riddled with
social and economic problems."1
There is another position — one that
looks to the subnational. Here reference is
made to the intolerance that some Japanese
allegedly exhibit toward minorities, the
Koreans for example. It is argued,
Nakasones statement is symtomatic of the
attitudes which inform that claimed intol
erance. Further, the subnational focus
By Winston E. Langley
holds, while the national government itself
may not advocate it as an outlook, there is a
ast September, news reports in
sense among many Japanese that the post
war economic success of their country is
formed the world that the prime
minister of Japan. Yasuhiro Nakasone,
directly related to Japan’s ethnic homoge
had attributed to the number of minorities
neity.2
in the US. —specifically Afro-Americans.
The two orientations which have charac
Puerto Ricans and Mexicans — the reason
terized the reaction of commentators, both
for a claimed lower intelligence level on the
in the US. and Japan, share two common
part of Americans when compared with
properties: they imply that the prime
Japanese.
minister of Japan made a racial slur against
America and some Americans, an implica
Reactions to the reported statement
were immediate, with some commentators tion which Nakasone in his official apology
to the U.S. government denies.3 Secondly,
emphasizing the fact that Japan had become
they- do not question the validity of the
rather certain of itself and that the prime
minister k statement only reflects the coun claim contained in the reported statement,
try's growing pride in its economic and as if there were a tacit agreement that the
technical achievements. Some commen claim is accurate but was in poor taste to
tators posited Tokyok 250 years of the have publicly asserted it.
Tokugawa Shogunate — which closed
Regardless of the importance of the
Japank doors to foreigners and helped to above speculated-on motives or forces that
foster among Japanese a sense of may have caused the troubling statement,
uniqueness —while others contended that tiie issue of central significance is being
the offending statement bespeaks the per overlooked. And that is: the issue of race in
ception on the part of many inJapan that the die contemporary global political economy.
latter’s former mentor, the United States, is This essay will focus on the race issue after

Race and the
Global Political
Economy

L

Published
by Digital Howard @ Howard University,
NEW DIRiCTIONS .ILM.V 196?

a brief historical sketch in which the U.S.,
because of its dominant role in the global
economy since 1945, will be featured.
Pre-1945
One need not recapitulate here the role of
race in supporting the enslavement of AfroAmericans or in shaping the political econ
omy of the United States. One, however,
should recall that after the Civil War —
especially in the 1880s and 1890s — there
was considerable debate in the US. about
what the sociopolitical standing of Blacks
should be. Although they could not be
regarded as the equal of whites —the legal
principle of equality before the law notwith
standing — the labor of Blacks was a
necessary predicate to economic advance
ment for all. The answer to Uus dilemma
resided in a form of benevolent accom
modation —one which would allow indus
trial training for Blacks, a measure of
disapproval on their being physically
abused, including being lynched, and for
malized racial division. Added thereto was
the call for cooperation between leaders of
the two racial communities to promote
improved race relations, which became
more pronounced during and after World
War I.
Paralleling the above development were
two others: the fear of assimilation between
the races at home; the concern for the type
of racial relationship that the US. would
have to entertain abroad if her economic
ambitions were to be adequately satisfied.
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In case of the former, which expressed itelf
in terms of "homogeneity." "racial purity."
or "racial integrity."4 it was a fear among
whites that the race to which they belonged
could undergo a form of debilitating stagna
tion. Why? Blacks were said to be inferior in
such fundamental qualities as intelligence,
enterprise, initiative and creativity. Since
these differences between the races were
perceived to be permanent, the mixing of
the races through intermarriage could only
result in an increase in the intellectually
inferior and the erosion of the prospects for
the progress of the American civilization.
(A minority viewpoint, which one author
calls cultural environmentalism,5 con
tended that the differences were not genetic
— "permanent" - and could be eliminated
over time to ensure an equalitarian so
ciety).
In the case of international relations, the
domestic racial sentiments in the U.S. found
strong expression, but in a more complex
form. On the one hand, one finds the settled
aversion to mixing with non-white races
south of the Rio Grande — “Latin race
mixed with Indian and African blood."''’ It
was this aversion which, in large part,
informed the decision of the U.S. not to
incorporate all of Mexico in 1848 and which,
in the 1870s, effectively undermined Presi
dent Grant 5 efforts to annex the Domin
ican Republic.
On the other hand, one finds a restless
nation in the 1890s. especially after the
panic of 1893-94. which is being told that
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the U.S. is threatened with decline unless it
expands and meets an emerging economic
competition that all vigorous nations must
win if they are to survive. (These were the
last days of Europe’s partition of Africa, of
European, Russian and Japanese expansion
into China, and the Spanish empire.) In
deed. from the political rhetoric of The
odore Roosevelt to the scholarly pen of
Brooks Adams, one finds the same counsel.
For Roosevelt, the U.S. could not avoid
taking Hawaii, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the
Philippines. In the 20th century, with the
emergence of many nations, if the US.
stood idly by and sought "ease and ignoble
peace," he claimed, or if it shrank from “the
hard contests where men must win at the
hazard of their lives. . . then the bolder and
the stronger peoples will pass us by, and will
win for themselves the domination of the
world."7
For Adams, the energy of a vigorous
people —Americans as well as others — is
manifested in war or economic competition;
and when a centralized society "disinte
grates under the pressure of economic
competition, it is because the energy of the
race has been exhausted.""
Was the U.S. disintegrating or was it
possessed of the requisite vigor to challenge
others?
Those who sought expansion won. But it
came in the face of considerable pessimism
over the perceived challenge which the non
white races would pose to the “Anglo-Saxon
races” (in the U.S. this phrase was fre

quently used) and to those of the Christian
faith. The pessimism was warranted for
people like Edgar Murphy, a leading accommodationist. He noted that everywhere the
former “coalition of weaker groups is being
broken up. and the inferior peoples are
being . . . reorganized . . . (into) stronger
aggregates: and that the co-existence of
whites and non-whites under such condi
tions posed problems of vast proportions—
"problems of the strong living with the
weak . . . so living as to assure peace
without afflicting desolation, as to preserve
order without defeating justice, as to uphold
a s ta te w h ic h w ill e x p r e s s th e life o f th e
h ig h e r g r o u p without enfeebling or destroy
ing that waiting manhood of the weaker
peoples which itself craves and deserves
expression."9
Murphys solution and the one followed
by the US. was to replicate abroad what was
practiced at home: benevolent accommoda
tion, not equality. So the people of Hawaii,
Panama, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and
Cuba, for example, would be helped to
acquire minimal skills —skills necessary to
help the U.S. deal with economic competi
tion with other countries; and indigenous
leaders would be recruited to collaborate
with their white counterparts to urge racial
harmony and solidarity: In no case, how
ever, would the notion of equality be
accepted. This was the operating policy
from the 1890s — one that also guided
President Wilson.
As the moral and political leader at the
NEW DIREC TIONS JULY W
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ington's economic assistance to Britain.
This is not to suggest that Britain had a
more progressive outlook on the issue of
race. Churchills reaction to the g e n e r a l
statements about human rights in the
Atlantic Charter included the position that
such statements of rights implied no com
mitment concerning London's policies
within its own colonies.11
Even more compelling was the reaction
to some proposals by China at the San
Francisco Conference which drafted the
United Nations Charter. What Japan was to
the Paris Peace Conference, in respect to
tlie racial issue, China was to San Francisco.
Peking, which had even before the latter
conference sought to have the major states
Post-1945
take a position on racial discrimination,
The time from 1945 to the 1960s witnessed become 3 focal point of concern. New
some changes in the racial policies in the Zealand, fearing an influx of non-whites,
U.S. — changes which gave the cultural was worried that China would call for
environmentalists an apparent ascendency. formal recognition of the principle of racial
It is these changes that sponsored the equality; so. too, was Australia. The U.S. at
domestic civil rights legislation at home first—in the person of its Secretary of State
and. to a degree, urged a more supportive Edward Stettinius — while acknowledging
stand on human rights abroad. These the need for " g r e a te r fr e e d o m a n d g r e a te r
changes, however, were not without consid o p p o r tu n ity for all peoples of every race,”11
erable struggle.
was not prepared to support such a formal
Despite the racial doctrines which in recognition. Congress, in particular, was
formed some of the horrors committed anxious about the impact of any such
during World War II; in spite of the high, recognition on domestic race relations.
moral-sounding themes of instruments
China, unlike Japan which stood alone at
such as the Atlantic Charter (the August 14. the Paris conference, had support. And it
1941 joint declaration of principles by was the swelling of this support — from
Roosevelt and Churchill that promised a Brazil. India, Mexico, the Philippines. Cuba
j u s t and stable world after the war); and
and Egypt — that influenced the scope of
even in face of the remarkable constitution the human rights and for fundamental
of the United Nations Educational. Scien freedoms for a l l w i th o u t d is t in c t io n a s to
tific, and Cultural Organization (UN race. sex. language or religion."13
ESCO),10 attempts to remove the issue of
The U.S. sought protection from, among
race from p u b lic debate were more of a other things, the implications of this human
tactical move than a conviction about the rights threat by limiting the ability of the
equality of racial groups.
UN. to interfere within its domestic juris
Support for the latter conclusion can be diction.14 even though it gave general
found in, among others, the expressed support to the adoption in 1948 of the
attitude of governments during the period Universal Declaration of Human Rights
in question. Before the issuance of the (UDHR) and, in 1966, to the International
Atlantic Charter, the British Foreign Office Covenants on Human Rights. South Africa,
had prepared a memorandum on the ques too. led by Jan C. Smuts, took the lead in
tion of race. It noted the difficulty of supporting the idea of human rights at the
maintaining racial discrimination in the risk of contradicting Smuts’ previous stand.
world as it then stood —after all, people of
“In 1945." observed W.E.B. Du Bois.
varying racial backgrounds were being "Jan Smuts, prime minister of South Africa,
asked to sacrifice everything, including who had once declared that every white
their lives, to fight against Nazism.
man in South Africa believes in the suppres
The statement went on to note, however, sion of the Negro except those who are
that it would be unwise to raise the issue 'mad. quite mad’, stood before the as
since, among other things, the Americans sembled peoples of the world and pleaded
did not believe in racial equality, and to for an article on ‘human rights' in the
inject the subject into international debate United Nations Charter. Nothing so vividly
would have the effect of jeopardizing Wash illustrates the twisted contradiction of

Paris Peace Conference of 1919-20 — that
important conference which concluded the
peace treaty with Germany, formed the
League of Nations and sought to shape a
new world order —Wilson, who had called
upon people during the war to fight so that
the world could be made safe for democracy,
sought to lead that new order. He even
became the principal advocate of the right
to self-determination; yet he rejected
Japan’s call, at the Paris conference, for an
endorsement of the principle of racial
equality. It was that policy which fashioned
22 U.S. behavior during the 1930s and the
early years of the 1940s.
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thought in the minds of white men.”14
s noted before, the cultural environ
mentalists appeared, after WW II, to
have gained some ascendency over
the geneticists who saw Blacks and other
minorities as permanently inferior to
whites — an ascendency which informed
much of the changes in civil rights legisla
tion. By the middle and late 1960s, however,
matters had begun to change, and the
geneticists began to reclaim their former
public standing.
The issue took on world-wide academic
significance when Arthur Jensen, a promi
nent American educational psychologist,
released what he claimed was the result of a
project he had conducted among children of
different racial groups. His report, pub
lished in the H a r v a r d E d u c a t i a u i l R e 
v ie w } * contended that intelligence is
largely hereditary and is not susceptible to
material alteration by the environment.
Further, like his prominent predecessor of
the 1920s, CarlC. Brigham, who contended
that American n a t i o m l intelligence would
decline more rapidly than that of “European
national groups, owing to the presence here
of the Negro,"17Jensen claimed that Blacks
in the U.S. tended to inbreed hereditary
defects and this depresses their genetic
potential more than whites.
Views similar to those of Jensens, includ
ing those of William Shockly, and Professor
Wesley Grilz George.1" were expressed
before and have been subjected to some
formidable dissensions. Despite the dis
senting opinions Jensen's thesis attracted
and its vigorous refutation by Professor
Jerome S. Kagan of Harvard University,19it
nonetheless gained academic respectability
and governed the thinking within many
“respectable quarters” during the '70s. It is
prevalent in those very quarters today.

A

Race and Political Economy
Between 1945 and the middle of the 1960s,
for all its problems, the U.S. economy was
able to sustain what John Kenneth Galbraith
aptly called the affluent society. With that
affluence —and within tolerable social and
racial advancement — people experienced
an improvement in their material circum
stances. And wfhen employment and other
factors of social dislocation interrupted, a
cushion of federal intervention could be
favorably invoked. Funds were available.
Even in the midst of a Vietnam War that was
bleeding the treasury, "guns and butter"
were deemed to be affordable, and the
Johnson administration initiated steps to
ward what he called the Great Society —
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one in which, among other things, material
poverty would be no more. Those years also
witnessed the greatest progress in civil
rights legislation. Then matters began to
change.
By 1973. the ofl crisis shook the U.S.
economy to its foundations, threatening the
national standard erfliving; and the following
year. Third World states collectively called
for a New International Economic Order
(NIEO). In the meantime, controversies
arose over affirmative action programs.
Conflicts emerged within unions whose
last-hired, first-fired policies weighed un
favorably on the overwhelming majority of
the last-hired who were non-whites. People
began to seek ways, in face of rising inflation
and increasing welfare expenditures, to
reduce government expenditures. Psychol
ogist Gordon Allport has observed that
downward mobility, periods of unemploy
ment and depression as well as general
economic dissatisfaction are all positively
correlated with prejudice/’0
The preceding does not suggest that
Jensens thesis induced or was induced by
these developments. Rather, it merely coin
cided with and was part of what was taking
place — restoring racial sentiments to the
public forum in which they were always
present but not always visibly active.
he U.S. came out of World War II
determined to use its economic ad
vantage to structure the global econ
omy to its benefit. The latter, according to
Dean Acheson, who later became secretary
of state, could be achieved by looking
outside the U.S.. "to other markets and
those markets are abroad."21 In more
concrete terms. William Clayton, assistant
secretary of state for economic affairs, told
a congressional committee in March 1945
that if the U.S. wanted a relatively high level
of employment and a national income in the
neighborhood of $150 billion, it would have
to sell about $10 billion worth of goods. “In
other words." he said, “we’ve got to export
three times as much as we exported before
the war if we are to keep our industryrunning somewhere near capacity."22 (This
near capacity would allow for a high level of
employment). But how. in specific terms,
were such goals to be realized? Through
something called multilateral trade, of
course.
The latter, in combination with the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund
— frequently called the Bretton Wxxis
system after the place in New Hampshire
where the 1944 Monetary and Financial
Conference took place — entailed a two

T
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pronged approach. The Fund, for example, borrow from U.S. technology.
was to ensure trade stability by providing
The EEC and Japan nevertheless contin
needed foreign exchange: and the Bank was ued an unabating challenge to the U.S.
to improve the climate for international which, though enjoying sturdy earnings
investment.
from foreign investments and international
he main thrust, however, entailed a banking operations, found itself having
two-pronged approach to global eco balance of payments problems. By the late
nomic relationships: 1) breaking down
1960s, the Nixon administration sought to
all exclusive economic ties which states had pressure America's major trading partners
previously arranged among themselves; 2) to make certain concessions by unilaterally
opening up all sectors of a nations economy weakening the Bretton Woods system.
to private enterprise in such a way that all However, the partners were not forthcom
other nations would have an equal chance to ing.
With plant closings, inflation and rising 23
enter into trade and other relations with it.
Because the U.S. was the most powerful unemployment during the late 1970s. the
nation (and the one least negatively affected editors of B u s in e s s W eek, in 1980, sounded
by the war), that equality was really un the alarm that the U.S. had sustained
"precipitous loss of competitiveness (in) the
equal.
The reasoning in Washington was that in last 15 rears," of which the wave of plant
an economic system as the one it sought to closings was but the most vivid manifesta
create, while others would derive some tion; that the economy must “undergo a
benefits, the U.S. would enjoy the most. f u n d a m e n t a l change if it is to retain a
Indeed, this was true for a period. The m e a s u r e o f v ia b ility let 3lone leadership in
question then, for the U.S was: How could the remaining 20 years of this century;" and
such a policy be implemented? How could that the goal must be "nothing less than a
the U.S. persuade non-Westem nation reindustrialization of America.”"states to support its interest and. more
The call for reindustrialization was in
generally, the ideology implied in that accord with a theme that was being raised
interest. Certainly not with any overt or by some:26 that the growth in the loss of
otherwise detectable international expres manufacturing jobs by the U.S. was not part
sion of racism. Such behavior would be. as of the usual business cycle but the expres
understated by one scholar.23 a liability. sion of a permanent loss of basic industries
Thus, the economic concerns of 1944-45 caused by foreign competition. In other
overcame certain racial anxieties and de words, America was being d e - i n d u s 
manded a tactical support for the principle tria lis e d .
of racial equality.
In the midst of these developments.
The multilateral system is that which Third World countries — that group which
supported the affluent society; because of was expected to remain “fragmented and
the preponderant power the U.S. exercised dependent" in the words of former national
within it. it also created a false sense that security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and
America was “economically independent of from which "nothing important can
the outside world, while the outside (world come."27 in the words of Henry Kissinger—
was) extremely dependent on the U.S"24 challenged what had been left of the
And. in part, because of that false sense, the economic system created by the US. in
U.S. has been unable to admit certain 1944-45. In 1964, through the United
economic weaknesses. For example, the Nations Conference on Trade and Develop
U.S. could not admit that it was dependent ment (UNCTADX Third World natioas did
on Third World states and that “foreign aid" what Murphy in the late 19th century had
was part of the national interest. Such aid feared: they began to organize as a bloc in
was for a long time characterized by some order to make effective demands for a
Americans as “give-aways" to "backward" change in what they considered the "brutal
people.
ground rules" of international economic
Even though by the middle of the 1960s a relations. It was not until a decade later,
growing European Economic Community however, under their proposed NIEO that a
(EEC) and a vigorous Japan were beginning comprehensive program was presented to
to give the U.S. considerable challenge industrial states in general, and the U.S. in
within the global economic system that the particular.
Coming as it did a year after the oil
US. had designed, one still heard such
claims as “when America sneezes, Europe embargo by oil-exporting states in the
catches pneumonia" or that the Japanese do Middle East, the U.S. was in trouble.
not create anything; they merely copy or Attempts were made in varying fora to
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negotiate some compromises but all proved
unavailing. During the Carter administra
tion. a plan was devised for a North-South
conference to be held in Cancun, Mexico, in
1981, with the hope that it would yield some
economic concessions from the North.
Indeed, the U.S. began to place emphasis on
what one may call managerialism. The
latter, sponsored by the Trilateral Commis
sion (composed of influential American.
European, and Japanese leaders) espouses
cooperation, partnership, collaboration in
the handling of an interdependent world,
w instead of confrontation and unilateral deci
sion-making.
The conference in Cancun—attended by
President Reagan rather than Carter—was
a failure because Reagan felt that the entire
ideological premise of the NIEO was wrong
(for it emphasized government interven
tion in the economy) and, as such, could not
commend itself to concessions from the
U.S. in particular, and the North in general.
But Third World states have been no less
determined to act as one in order to effect
changes in the global economic structure.
The erosion of the U.S. industrial capac
ity continued in such a manner that by 1985,
for the first time in more than 70 years, the
U.S. became a debtor nation. And the
financing of the national deficit came from
borrowing, principally from the Japanese.
By August of 1986, Jeffrey Garten of
Shearson Lehman Brothers spoke in terms
of America "going begging to West Ger
man)’ and Japan."*8
In economic terms, the U.S. is caught in a
bind. Only a basic reorientation can provide
any long-term help. Lowering interest rates
can help, but only marginally. So. too, can
devaluating the dollar. Urging Japan and
Germany to purchase more American
goods under the threat of using tariffs to
keep out their products may be appealing to
the uninformed but will do little else, since
those countries account for no more than 10
and 4 percent, respectively, of American
exports.
Assuming that they wish to purchase
more American goods, what will the U.S.
sell them? As Garten points out: it cannot
be steel, since American steel companies
are in poor shape: not agricultural goods,
there is a world-wide glut: and in the
semiconductor and computer industries,
imports will continue to capture an in
creased share of the domestic market. In
the latter regard, the Joint Economic Com
mittee of Congress had predicted that the
high-technology sector of the economy
from which the U.S. had a $27 billion trade
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surplus in 1980, will suffer a $2 billion
deficit in 1986. - Even the financial center is
shifting from New York to Tokyo, with the
latter's investment banks replacing Amer
ica's.
It is within the context of a nation-state
which finds it difficult to admit its own
weakness, which is no longer strong enough
to force its major trading partners to act as
it would prefer, which finds even the pre
viously disorganized Third World unaccept
ing of its prescriptions for international
economic order,30 and which finds tradi
tional alternatives non-responsive to its
problems, that one must reexamine the
statement of the Japanese prime minister.
An America, finding itself fallen from its
exalted economic standing of the 1950s —
and even early 1960s—began asking: Why?
What is the cause of this decline? Con
currently another question began to be
posed: What is the reason for the success of
Japan? The answer frequently given is the
education and skills of the Japanese people.
When one speaks of the skills and the
literacy of the Japanese, however, one
should not think in traditional terms of the
capacity simply to read and write. What
Galbraith as early as 1967 called the "edu
cational and scientific estate"—that body of
educators and research scientists as well as
engineers who. when combined with civil
servants, journalists and writers, create the
basis for the new industrial state—would be
more appropriate.31
Inasmuch as the expression "educational
and scienfitic estate" connotes a degree of
elitism, one must urge a broader social view.
Japan has been mobilizing its educational
system as its principal industry, with the
view that what will determine the future
economic power of states is not so much
gold, territory, savings or capital, but the
skill of its population, People must be able to
piaster —interpret, absorb, process, store,
and transmit —vast bodies of information.
No longer, for example, will nations be able
to succeed economically while hiding the
illiteracy of their populations.
In looking at Japan's success in this rising
information age. people began to compare it
with the U.S. The weakness of the US., it
has been claimed, has been the lack of skills
among its population. And the c h i e f c a u s e of
America's economic decline, therefore, has
been the large number of unskilled people,
especially minorities. So the very v i c t i m of
domestic racial discrimination is now the
cause, in the eyes of many, of America's
economic weakness. When the Japanese
prime minister made the statement, there

fore, he was not saying anything novel; he
was merely repeating what had been said
time and again in influential circles within
the U.S.
Past, Present and Future
From the above historical sketch, one
should perceive at least two patterns: First,
that just as many white Americans have
found it difficult to envision a truly multi
racial n a tio n a l society, so, too, have they
found it problematic to conceive of a gen
uinely multiracial i n te r n a ti o n a l society.

To meet the economic
challenge, the U.S. must
seek to have a society
which enjoys social
solidarity and is highly
skilled.

Second, on each occasion when racial
antipathies have come into conflict with
economic aspirations, a "tactical fix" —no
effort to find a real solution—in the area of
the former would be effected in order to
successfully pursue the latter. Neither of
these two patterns can be continued much
longer without causing irreparable harm to
the national as well as the international
community.
People have become more negatively
sensitized by racial prejudice, and the global
village makes it increasingly difficult, if not
impossible, to disguise its expression.
Racism, as indicated by Paul Erlich and. to a
degree borne out by the November (1986)
issue of S o u th ,3' has become no less
dangerous than a bomb; and it can explode
at any time. So what might be a path to a
solution?
The first step for the U.S. is to recognize
that the economic challenge it faces is one
that, in all likelihood, will become more
formidable. That challenge will come from
China. India. South Korea, Brazil (from
Europe, too) and. even more, from Japan.
The latter aspires to economic control of
the 21 si century through its ascendency in
technology. If matters continue as they have
the past 15 years or so, Japan could very
well achieve its aim.
The second and most important step is
for Washington to realize that it cannot
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meet successfully this economic challenge
unless it takes fundamental action to solve
its racial problem. And this must be done
both at home and abroad. True, there are
other difficulties — corporate short-term
planning and the overwhelming emphasis
on military research, to name but a few —
with which the U.S. must successfully
wrestle.
In case of the military emphasis, while
the U.S. has been harnessing most of its
available technical brainpower to engage in
military research and development, the
Japanese have been focusing on Chilian
technology, thus, advancing ahead of the
U.S. in fields such as solar energy, semicon
ductors. biotechnology, robotics, ceramics
and supercomputers.13 As important as
these other problems are, however, they are
not as crucial as the racial one.
To meet the economic challenge, the U.S.
must seek to have a society which enjoys
social solidarity and is highly skilled. But
social solidarity cannot be purchased by a
replication of past tactical maneuvers; it can
come only as a result of a genuine commit
ment to a multiracial society based on
equality. As such, the law —useful as it is —
cannot be the principal tool; Americans
must resort to the cultural instrument
which, hopefully, will sponsor a renaissance
in Blinking and attitudes.
The pervasiveness of the cultural will
expresses itself in even' sphere of life —
from the image conveyed of groups on
television and in novels—to the disposition
one holds with respect to one’s problems. In
the midst of this search for solidarity, a
comprehensive system of education must
be introduced to inculcate skills to interpret
and use ones environment. As used here,
“skills" should not be equated with tech
nical aptitudes only; it entails those broader
cultural abilities that will make the society
a s a w h o le a dwelling in which each person
will have his or her capabilities elicited to
the fullest extent. With the traditional
alienation or constant injury to the dignity
of minority groups removed, they too. in a
few generations, will exhibit skills compara
ble to others.
Internationally, the changed attitude
would yield returns that should be most
favorable. Not only would the U.S. become a
model in a multiracial world, but it would
open up a fruitful interchange with the less
developed countries (LDCs). The inter
change that springs from the spirit which
claims that “nothing important can come"
from those countries would be replaced by
one which is prepared to examine their
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concerns on their own merits. And this
would have a reverberating effect — from
Third World proposals for a NIEO in the
U.N. and the latter’s associate institutions
such as UNESCO. Inasmuch as the future
economic growth of LDCs will have the
greatest impact on the future global econ
omy. it does not take much imagination to
grasp the extent to which the prospects for
the United States’ economic leadership
rests on its relations with those nations.
The present, therefore, discouraging as
it appears sometimes, offers two pos
sibilities for the future: America can seek to
remove the disease of racial prejudice and,
in so doing, harness itself to confront
international economic challenges — not
because race should be used as an instru
ment of economic objectives but because
those challenges offer an opportunity for an
overall reappraisal and transformation. Or
America can follow its current course,
preserve the disease in its social womb and
face the shock of economic backwardness.
In the latter event, “scapegoats" —nation
ally and subnationally — will be looked for,
and the U.S. may not be 3ble, materially, to
distinguish itself from Nazi German): Inter
nationally, there may be war —a trade war.
first, and perhaps even a military confronta
tion — with Japan. □ *i7
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